What IS America’s Strategic Narrative?

As I sat this evening and read news stories from across the globe via conventional news sources and social media conduits, I started to question what is America’s Grand Strategy, really? Reality is, whether intentional or not, America does have a perceived National Strategic Narrative whether it has a Grand Strategy or not (to use a Clausewitzian context) based on our actual actions in comparisons with our national rhetoric. The question is, given the current domestic and global environment, what is it? Additionally, if we do not have a purposeful narrative, what should it be? The National Security Strategy is only one element in how the world perceives us. With the explosion of the 24-hour news cycle, social media, and the exponentially evolving information environment, America lives in a glass house that the rest of the world can see into in real time. Regardless of what we say, the world can see us for what we really are. The time has come for us to re-think what national strategy (or grand strategy) actually is, and what it should look like.  Wayne Porter and Mark Mykleby opened the discussion wide open in 2011 with their work entitled, “A National Strategic Narrative,” which can be found here. The introduction states:

A narrative is a story. A national strategic narrative must be a story that all Americans can understand and identify with in their own lives. America’s national story has always see-sawed between exceptionalism and universalism. We think that we are an exceptional nation, but a core part of that exceptionalism is a commitment to universal values – to the equality of all human beings not just within the borders of the United States, but around the world. We should thus embrace the rise of other nations when that rise is powered by expanded prosperity, opportunity, and dignity for their peoples. In such a world we do not need to see ourselves as the automatic leader of any bloc of nations. We should be prepared instead to earn our influence through our ability to compete with other nations, the evident prosperity and wellbeing of our people, and our ability to engage not just with states but with societies in all their richness and complexity. We do not want to be the sole superpower that billions of people around the world have learned to hate from fear of our military might. We seek instead to be the nation other nations listen to, rely on and emulate out of respect and admiration.

With this document being two years old and given the current state of the the US and global economies, the current state of Afghanistan, as well as  the issues across the entire African continent, the Levant, Iran, North Korea, etc. what is the current perceived American Strategic Narrative and what should our Strategic Narrative actually be? What would America have to do to actually create and sell a believable  narrative to the  world? Curious to hear your thoughts…

Logos, Pathos, Ethos: Synergy of Reason and Passion as a Catalyst for Insurgent Mobilization and Breakout

The birth of revolution is a dangerous and dynamic endeavor.  More interestingly though is how insurgent movements attempt to persuade average citizens to risk their lives in such an endeavor against a state power, attempting to grow in numbers and strength until such point the insurgency is a potent threat against the state.   However, insurgent movements face a dilemma achieving this goal.  While many average citizens may agree rationally with the insurgency because of their frustration with the state, many times the benefits of joining the insurgent cause are not worth the possible loss of their own lives.[1]  Because of this cost-benefit analysis dilemma, effective insurgencies will generate appeals to the populace and actions that are not only rationally based, but equally, if not more, emotionally based to overcome this problem.[2]  Using the framework of the concepts of logos, pathos, and ethos[3] with examples from current events, history, and modern marketing practices, effective insurgencies methodically synergize and calculate the use of reason, passion/emotion, and credibility to influence, persuade, and manipulate the populace to actively join and/or support their cause.  Continuing along this line, it is possible to create a qualitative, abstract mathematical model showing that to the degree an insurgency is effective at synergizing logos, pathos, and ethos in its messages and actions on the populace, the state, and its own members, it can have a catalytic effect on insurgent mobilization and eventual breakout against the state.

While most insurgencies fail, the successful ones are able to mobilize people in overcoming their natural, logical fears of opposing a sitting regime through the effective manipulation of perceptions.  The use of propaganda and persuasion (which includes the use of words and actions to instigate behavioral change) is quintessential to this effort.  Effective propaganda and persuasion utilizes rational, emotional, and credible appeals.[4]  For the purpose of this paper, a simple framework to use in conveying this concept is Aristotle’s concept of Logos (appeals using reason/logic), Pathos (appeals using emotion), and Ethos (appeals using the credibility of the speaker).  The ability to manipulate and persuade is a function of the effective and synergistic use of all three.[5]  The intent of this paper is not to analyze Aristotle’s concept of rhetoric, but use it as a framework to convey that the calculating and effective use of logos, pathos, and ethos together in words and actions by an insurgency can have tremendous positive effects on insurgent growth and power.

In order for individuals or groups to join or support an insurgency, they should know what the insurgency stands for.  The use of reason, or logos, is highly suitable for this explanation.  In its purest form, logos is the use of information (objective and/or subjective) and reason without emotion to convey an argument.  Insurgencies use many different techniques in conveying its ideology to the populace using reason and logic.  For example, the Taliban incorporate things such as “night letters” posted in villages and hold shura councils with village leaders to convey information or threats.  In addition, the Taliban use audio cassettes and the internet websites stating their intent and espousing their goals.[6]  Similarly, Mao Tse-Tung used propaganda teams to generate weekly wall newspapers for placement in the villages called the “Current Affairs Bulletin,” which consisted of educational material and information about the status of the struggle and the Red Army.[7]  Better known is Mao’s use of formal, systematic education and indoctrination programs that encompassed locals as well as newly recruited insurgents used to teach them the goals of the revolution and drive the populace toward that end state.[8]

However, reason alone may not be enough to persuade an individual that the benefits of joining an insurgency outweigh the potential overwhelming costs.  The use of pathos, or emotional appeal, helps overcome this hurdle.  Civilian marketing and advertising agencies use pathos everyday to persuade individuals and groups to purchase items they logically know they do not need, generating billions of dollars in profits for the companies these agencies represent.  Marc Gobé explains it is important to “understand the formidable and undefined emotional power that ultimately sways everybody’s decision making.”[9]  Relating to insurgency, Chalmers Johnson, is his book Revolutionary Change, states a revolutionary ideology “will supply intellectually and emotionally satisfying explanations of what is wrong with the old order.”[10] In a related manner, Ted Gurr in his book Why Men Rebel relates that an insurgency must generate “aggression-releasing cues” to move a group to violence since just being “discontent alone is not enough.”[11]  This implies the need for an emotional draw to bring individuals to action even when they are disenfranchised and logically believe in the cause.  Additionally, the use of pathos is critically important in persuading the uneducated toward an insurgent ideology that may be too complex for the average individual to understand.[12]  An insurgency can also use pathos to enflame anger from the state to incite repression to help move the populace closer to its agenda.[13]  Adolf Hitler, outlining his persuasion and propaganda principles in Mein Kampf which were ultimately followed by Joseph Goebbels, gave preeminence to pathos.[14]  Even today, authors such as Malcolm Gladwell in his book The Tipping Point, suggest pathos is so strong, its effectual use can be highly contagious and even viral.[15]  There are many examples of the successful use of pathos by an insurgency in the Chinese Revolution and modern day Afghanistan.

The propaganda of Mao Tse-Tung shows an adept use of pathos.  Mao realized the value of subtlety and indirectly communicating a message through emotionally-connected mediums, which over time would make the populace more open to direct, logos oriented forms.  One technique Mao incorporated was the use of symbols.  Mao believed, just as modern advertisers do today, that the representative nature of symbols evokes an emotional response.[16]  Mao also believed “the slogan [would] mobilize the people, who [would] then have to do the work to attain the objective that excited them in the first place.”[17]  This indicates Mao realized the power of emotional appeals.  Using this concept to further sow the seeds of revolution, Mao incorporated the use of art, poetry, music, dance, plays,[18] and operas at the local village level along with many other types of mediums to generate an emotional connection with the populace and his recruits.[19]  He would continue these techniques later in the Cultural Revolution on a national scale.[20]

In the same manner, the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan/Pakistan are also very proficient in the use and understanding of the power of pathos.  The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point has devoted an entire project to images and visual motifs used by insurgents in Afghanistan and other Islamic extremist organizations around the world.[21]  These visual motifs serve the same purpose to evoke emotion in a similar manner as Mao’s techniques. It breaks down the use of colors and specific symbols, and what emotions these are meant to evoke. The Taliban also incorporate the use of timeliness with these motifs (especially if they are graphic images tied to an event) to further increase and capitalize on the emotional response.[22] They also use poetry, songs, and chants along with various forms of graphic imagery.[23]  Given the religious nature of their ideology, the Taliban have even used such techniques as providing ornate, colorful, and official-looking martyr certificates to the families of suicide bombers or slain fighters as a means to capitalize on the emotions generated by the loss.[24]  Tying in with pathos and logos, effective insurgencies also work on increasing their credibility with the populace.

Effective insurgencies also incorporate the use of ethos as means of persuading the populace.  An easy way an insurgency can increase its credibility is by actions themselves.  Actions could include such things as a successful attack against a government target or food provided for a local village that has been ignored by the government.  Mao believed “action would provide its own justification,” and he showed it by creating local shadow governments and organizations so that the local population could tangibly see the work and results of the insurgency and its ideology.[25] As part of this, physical presence of insurgents or presence of insurgent propaganda (marking territory) is important to reinforce this concept so the populace is reminded of the action and who was responsible.[26]  Essentially, it can be a reminder of the insurgency’s success or the failure of the government, which may also increase the ethos of the insurgency.

Ethos is also directly related to logos and pathos in many ways.  To the degree an insurgency is effective at logos and pathos, it will build ethos.  This increase in ethos will enable more responsiveness to an insurgency’s logos and pathos lines of persuasions on subsequent interactions with the populace.  If successfully persuading more individuals to join, the insurgency can conduct more and/or larger operations, potentially increasing the strength of it logos, pathos, and ethos persuasion.  This concept brings out the importance of the synergy of logos, pathos, and ethos.

Successful synergy of logos, pathos, and ethos can be a catalyst for insurgent growth.  Therefore, the key to success is careful planning of a comprehensive program that creatively links logos, pathos, and ethos into a unified endeavor.  An insurgency that carefully studies the populace and methodically crafts how every word, picture, and action will link together and its effect on the populace will have success.  Robert Gurr suggests the greater number, density, and creativity of media forms will assist in generating popular violence.[27]  The Chinese Revolution is an excellent example of such synergy.

Mao Tse-Tung’s calculated and comprehensive synergy of logos, pathos, and ethos shows how their creative use can mobilize a population against a state.  He purposefully ensured the elements of his education program were reflected in the symbols, arts, music, etc. and vice versa.  Simultaneously, he ensured actions taken reinforced teachings and desired emotions. Mao referred to this as “putting into the mold” as part of shaping the whole man toward revolutionary goals.[28]   In addition to combining logos, pathos, and ethos on a large-scale, Mao also ensured synergy of all three on the small scale as well.  For example, after capturing a government soldier (in very selected cases), Mao would ensure one of his most intelligent insurgents would question/interrogate the soldier.  Using exceptional logic, the insurgent would debate the soldier about the government (logos).  Over time, the soldier would realize he was unable to argue, feeling guilty and humiliated about the actions he had taken (pathos).  This in turn generated credibility (ethos) for the insurgent and reinforced the insurgency’s logos and pathos.  Eventually, the soldier would be released, generating gratitude for the insurgency (additional pathos).  This converted soldier would tell others of what had happened (a great platform of ethos for the insurgency), thus increasing the overall level of logos, pathos, and ethos of the insurgency, helping recruit more people to Mao’s cause.[29]  As this example demonstrates, calculated, successful synergy can breed success, which in turn can breed more success.

From this concept, to the degree an insurgency is able to carefully plan, synergize, and execute a persuasion/propaganda program using the aspects of logos, pathos, and ethos, the program can have a catalytic effect on increasing insurgent mobilization and growth.  The purpose of an insurgency persuasion program is to instruct or explain to the populace about the insurgency as well as shape, reinforce, or change the behavior of the populace in line with insurgent goals.[30]  The insurgency conducts persuasion through the use of media, whether conventional or unconventional, and actions such as the types discussed earlier for the purpose mentioned above. In this process, the insurgency will target the population to affect its cost benefit calculations relating to supporting the insurgency or the government.  A comprehensive, synergized persuasion program will contain all three elements of logos, pathos, and ethos and have elements that address all facets of the populace’s cost benefit calculation.  It is possible to build an abstract, qualitative model of this concept.

Figure 1 shows a rough, qualitative, abstract mathematical model adapted from Dr. Gordon McCormick’s model of conditional mobilization.[31]

 

FIGURE 1. Persuasion as a Catalyst on the Expected Value of Supporting the Insurgency.

This qualitative mathematical model shows to the degree an insurgency is successful at its elements of persuasion P (which is a function of the synergy of logos, pathos, and ethos) across the cost-benefit expectations of the populace, the insurgency can increase the expected value of the population supporting and joining the insurgency.  An insurgency can increase the expected benefits of supporting the insurgency while lowering the associated costs, while also potentially lowering the benefits of supporting the government while increasing the costs.  Essentially, all things being equal, if each element of persuasion is successful, the net effect is a positive increase in expected value in supporting the insurgency, or an increase in expected value of supporting the government if insurgent propaganda is unsuccessful.  The reason each cost and benefit has its own persuasion variable associated with it corresponds to the concept a successful persuasion program will be running multiple targets, medias, and themes at the same time. For instance, some may be coercive, while others may be unifying depending on the target and the goal.  The model also allows that some portions of the persuasion program may fail where others succeed.

The model in Figure 1 also suggests how an insurgency may overcome the “rational paradox” during the initial growth of an insurgency as they attempt to influence individuals to join, even though the initial costs seem to greatly outweigh the benefits.[32]  To the degree an insurgency is successful and remains successful at its persuasion program, it can conceivably increase its growth/support base rapidly, and lower the insurrection point, thus creating stable, steady growth.[33]  Studied, planned, and executed effectively, an insurgency’s creative use of synergistic persuasion could turn the idea of revolution into reality.

However, history shows most insurgencies are not carefully planned and executed.  In fact, most insurgencies end in failure.  The few that have been successful have common themes.  One of those themes is mastery of the manipulation and persuasion of the populace toward its cause.  Successful revolutionaries such as Mao Tse-Tung have shown the use and synergy of logic, emotion, and credibility through multiple forms of media and action can have tremendous effect.  Even today, groups such as the Taliban and even modern day marketing incorporate these tactics with great benefit.  The successful mastery, planning, and synergy of the use of logos, pathos and ethos by an insurgency can greatly increase the population’s willingness to support with an almost catalytic effect on their cost-benefit calculation.  Only by respecting, understanding, and ultimately using the power of this synergy as well, can a government work to retain the support of the populace over an insurgency.

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[1] Gordon H. McCormick and Frank Giordano, “Things Come Together: Symbolic Violence and Guerrilla Mobilisation,” Third World Quarterly 28, no. 2 (2007), 295, http://pdfserve.informaworld.com.libproxy.nps.edu/787733_793890206_771167049.pdf (accessed August 26, 2010).

[2] Jacques Ellul, Propaganda: The Formation of Men’s Attitudes [Propagandes], trans. Konrad Kellen and Jean Lerner (New York: Vintage Books, 1973), 11.

[3] Garth Jowett and Victoria O’Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion, 4th ed. (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 2006), 40.

[4] Ellul, Propaganda: The Formation of Men’s Attitudes, 4.

[5] Ken O’Quinn, “The Elements of Persuasion: Three Principles that Will Strengthen any Appeal,” Public Relations Tactics 16, no. 2 (2009), 20, http://content.ebscohost.com/pdf9/pdf/2009/PTA/01Feb09/36665244.pdf (accessed September 1, 2010).

[6] Oleg Svet, “Fighting for a Narrative: A Campaign Assessment of the US-Led Coalition’s Psychological and Information Operations in Afghanistan,” Small Wars Journal (September 12, 2010), 2, http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/537-svet.pdf (accessed September 12, 2010).

[7] Mao Tse-tung and Stuart R. Schram, Mao’s Road to Power: Revolutionary Writings 1912-1949 (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1992), 218.

[8] Ellul, Propaganda: The Formation of Men’s Attitudes, 304.

[9] Marc Gobé, Emotional Branding: The New Paradigm for Connecting Brands to People (New York: Allworth Press, 2009), 108.

[10] Chalmers A. Johnson, Revolutionary Change, 2nd ed. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982), 86.

[11] Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel, 1st Princeton Paperback ed. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971), 199.

[12] Ellul, Propaganda: The Formation of Men’s Attitudes, 79, 108-109.

[13] Gurr, Why Men Rebel, 213.

[14] Jowett and O’Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion, 230.

[15] Malcolm Gladwell, The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference, 1st Back Bay Paperback ed. (New York: Back Bay Books/Little, Brown, and Company, 2002), 85.

[16] Gobé, Emotional Branding: The New Paradigm for Connecting Brands to People, 126.

[17] Ellul, Propaganda: The Formation of Men’s Attitudes, 305.

[18] Sandra Eminov, “Folklore and Nationalism in Modern China,” Journal of the Folklore Institute 12, no. 2/3 (1975), 268-269, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3813929 (accessed September 1, 2010).

[19] Mao and Schram, Mao’s Road to Power: Revolutionary Writings 1912-1949, 217-224.

[20] B. Mittler, “Popular Propaganda? Art and Culture in Revolutionary China,” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 152, no. 4 (Dec, 2008), 478, http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?url=http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1723042581&Fmt=7&clientId=11969&RQT=309&VName=PQD (accessed August 23, 2010).

[21] Combating Terrorism Center, The Islamic Imagery Project: Visual Motifs in Jihadi Internet Propaganda (West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2006), 132, http://www.ctc.usma.edu/pdf/CTC%20–%20Islamic%20Imagery%20Project.pdf (accessed August 26, 2010).

[22] Ellul, Propaganda: The Formation of Men’s Attitudes, 43-44.

[23] Svet, “Fighting for a Narrative: A Campaign Assessment of the US-Led Coalition’s Psychological and Information Operations in Afghanistan,” 2.

[24] “Martyr Certificate by Taliban,” The Pak Factor, http://www.pakfactor.com/martyr-certificate-by-taliban.html (accessed September 12, 2010).

[25] Ellul, Propaganda: The Formation of Men’s Attitudes, 306.

[26] Mao and Schram, Mao’s Road to Power: Revolutionary Writings 1912-1949, 293.

[27] Gurr, Why Men Rebel, 224.

[28] Ellul, Propaganda: The Formation of Men’s Attitudes, 79.

[29] Ellul, Propaganda: The Formation of Men’s Attitudes, 312.

[30] Jowett and O’Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion, 29.

[31] McCormick and Giordano, Things Come Together: Symbolic Violence and Guerrilla Mobilisation, 301-302.

[32] McCormick and Giordano, Things Come Together: Symbolic Violence and Guerrilla Mobilisation, 296.

[33] McCormick and Giordano, Things Come Together: Symbolic Violence and Guerrilla Mobilisation, 304.

Intelligence in Irregular Warfare

“An insurgency will not be defeated on the battlefield. The fight is for the loyalty of the people…”[1]  Such statements are essential in discussions relating to counterinsurgency or other irregular warfare (IW) topics.  However, in many of these discussions a critical piece is missing.  That critical piece is acquiring relevant, useful information and intelligence on the population to ultimately win their loyalty over that of the enemy.[2]  According to Air Force Irregular Warfare doctrine, “Of primary importance is cultural [population-centric] intelligence which may require innovative collection and analysis methods.”[3]  The IW practitioner can categorize population-centric intelligence into two categories – “hard” and “soft.” The understanding, analysis, and fusion of these two categories of population-centric intelligence are critical in winning over the population, which is the center of gravity in the IW environment.

The first category of population-centric intelligence is “hard” intelligence.  Such intelligence relates to easily discoverable statistical and demographic information that is obtainable outside the target area of the population through existing intelligence archives or open source entities.  The “hard” category includes information relating to the ethnic distribution of the populace in question.[4]  It also includes information relating to religious makeup and distribution across the populace, economic/wealth distribution, gender ratio and roles,[5] literacy rates, mortality and disease rates, and other related topics.  The general history of the populace in question is also considered “hard” intelligence.  George W. Smith, Jr., in his work “Avoiding a Napoleonic Ulcer,” incorporates a remark from Robert Steele which states historical analysis is “the most fundamental [and] most neglected” facet of intelligence.[6]

The collection and baseline analysis of “hard” population-centric intelligence is possible before deployment.  Analyzing this “hard” data will allow the irregular warfighter to formulate an initial plan on how to win over the populace in an IW environment.  For example, the irregular warfighter could construct an ecological model-based plan which “focuses on the ways that the physical environment affects economic and social relationships.”[7]  The irregular warfighter could also use this “hard” data to formulate a plan for the populace based upon a social structure model which “examines how people organize political, economic, and social relationships, and how that method of organization determines roles, rights, and privileges of a group’s members.”[8]  By collecting and analyzing “hard” population-centric intelligence, the irregular warfighter can discover initial exploitable susceptibilities and vulnerabilities resident in the populace that can be used in formulating a plan to shift their alignment toward the irregular warfighter’s cause.  However, this “hard” intelligence is not enough to gain a comprehensive understanding of the population to the degree needed to truly shift it’s alignment as the center of gravity in the IW environment.  It also takes another category of intelligence.

The other category of population-centric intelligence is “soft” intelligence.  “Hard” intelligence alone cannot tell us what is going on inside the minds of the populace such as knowing their perceptions, intent, ultimate beliefs, etc. which are crucial in swaying the population as the center of gravity in the IW fight. “Human reactions cannot be reduced to an exact science,”[9] but there are ways to study the populace to gain this data.   “Soft” intelligence requires direct, human interaction with the targeted population,[10] and is much harder to measure than “hard” intelligence.  It includes information on social customs, social norms, myths, and traditions.[11]  While some of this data could feasibly exist in historical or other “hard” data sources, the only way to understand a population’s social “intelligence” as it relates to perceptions, grievances, empathy, social cognition, synchrony, and other facets is through direct contact and immersion in the populace.[12]

Another facet of the “soft” intelligence category is conduits of information flow.  Through immersion with a culture, the irregular warfighter can attain the understanding of formal and informal channels for information flow, and what types of information is propagated on each.  By understanding how information flows and the ability to tap into the indigenous information “network,” the irregular warfighter can greatly increase his knowledge of the other facets of the “soft” intelligence category, and may even verify the accuracy and validity of some “hard” category information listed earlier.[13]  Combined, the synergy of “hard” and “soft” intelligence can provide the irregular warfighter immense leverage with the populace.

This fusion of “hard” and “soft” population-centric intelligence, if adequately collected and analyzed, can give the irregular warfighter a unique insight into the mindset of the populace that he can use as leverage to shift the population’s alignment in his favor.  There are three ways this fusion can lead to success in an IW environment.

First, the synergy of “hard” and “soft” intelligence will increase the irregular warfighter’s ability to conduct effective persuasion and influence on the population.  Using the Yale model of persuasion (a theoretical approach to the concept of influence),[14] combining “hard” and “soft” intelligence on the populace allows the irregular warfighter to ensure he is using the correct information conduits and communicating effectively to ensure his messages gain the appropriate exposure, attention, comprehension, acceptance, retention, and translation (action) from the population.[15]  Essentially this will increase the irregular warfighter’s leverage by allowing him to communicate more efficiently with the populace and leverage the results of that communication to gain greater rapport with the populace, thus isolating the enemy.

This leads to the second point, and that is the fusion of “hard” and “soft” intelligence helps the irregular warfighter generate social capital with the populace.  Social capital is “the norms and unofficial rules that evolve over time and are often the indirect byproduct of interaction in a variety of situations.”[16]  Through the full-spectrum understanding of the populace, the irregular warfighter can generate projects and programs to create social capital and cohesion in the populace thus shifting the alignment of the populace away from the enemy.

Lastly, the fusion and analysis of “hard” and “soft” population-centric intelligence can help to identify “ʽanchor points’ – local personalities and local grievances that, if skillfully exploited, could drive a wedge between insurgents and the greater population. In other words, anchor points represented the enemy’s critical vulnerabilities.”[17]  Such items could be enemy activities that are unspoken, yet a bane to the local populace that are indirectly communicated that if removed by the irregular warfighter would generate positive effects with the populace and lead to even more intelligence.  Anchor points can also save money in the IW fight as well.  Rather than spend money on civil-military projects that the populace does not really need or want, the collection, analysis, and fusion of “hard” and “soft” population-centric intelligence can pinpoint the true needs of the populace highlighting low-cost, yet high payoff projects.  For instance, instead of spending millions of dollars on schools that may be unneeded or unwanted by the populace, effective intelligence could show, as Herb Daniels discusses, the best highest leverage project with the populace could be a simple, lowly outhouse.[18]

Too often in military operations, the focus of intelligence is on conventional enemy military units, hardware, and command and control systems.  While this might work for conventional warfighting, it can be detrimental to the IW fight.  In IW, the populace is the center of gravity.  As noted by International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan Intelligence Director Major General Michael Flynn, the importance of this lesson is high:

General McChrystal routinely issues distinct orders and clear guidance on the subject. When he states, “The conflict will be won by persuading the population, not by destroying the enemy,” it is not just a slogan, but an expression of his intent. Too much of the intelligence community is deaf to these directions – this must be remedied, and now. The General’s message must resonate throughout the entire community – top to bottom.[19]

It is possible to heed to this advice and leverage this center of gravity.  By focusing and synergizing population-centric intelligence, specifically “hard” intelligence before/during deployment and gaining immediate contact/immersion with the population upon deployment to generate “soft” intelligence, the irregular warfighter can generate many low-cost and high payoff events to leverage the populace away from the enemy.

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[1] Dale Andrade and James H. Willbanks, “CORDS/Phoenix: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Vietnam for the Future,” Military Review (March-April, 2006), 22, http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/milreviewmarch2.pdf (accessed November 18, 2010).

[2] Michael T. Flynn, Matt Pottinger and Paul D. Batchelor, “Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan,” Center for a New American Security (January, 2010), 7, http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/AfghanIntel_Flynn_Jan2010_code507_voices.pdf (accessed November 6, 2010).

[3] United States Air Force, Air Force Doctrine Document 2-3: Irregular Warfare. United States Air Force, 2007), 31, http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/usaf/afdd2-3.pdf (accessed November 30, 2010).

[4] Jack David Eller, From Culture to Ethnicity to Conflict : An Anthropological Perspective on International Ethnic Conflict (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999), 8.

[5] Muhammad Yunus, Banker to the Poor: Micro-Lending and the Battle Against World Hunger (New York: Public Affairs, 2003), 72.

[6] George W. Smith Jr., “Avoiding a Napoleonic Ulcer: Bridging the Gap of Cultural Intelligence,” Marine Corps War College (2004), 32, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA464461&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf (accessed November 6, 2010).

[7] Barak A. Salmoni and Paula Holmes-Eber, Operational Culture for the Warfighter (Quanitco, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2009), 22, http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps113013/opculture.pdf (accessed September 30, 2010).

[8] Salmoni and Holmes-Eber, Operational Culture for the Warfighter, 22.

[9] Smith Jr., Avoiding a Napoleonic Ulcer: Bridging the Gap of Cultural Intelligence, 33.

[10] Daniel Goleman, Social Intelligence: The New Science of Human Relationships (New York: Bantam Books, 2006), 84.

[11] Eller, From Culture to Ethnicity to Conflict: An Anthropological Perspective on International Ethnic Conflict, 30.

[12] Goleman, Social Intelligence: The New Science of Human Relationships, 331.

[13] United States Air Force, Air Force Doctrine Document 2-3: Irregular Warfare, 32.

[14] Kim Cragin and Scott Gerwehr, “The Theoretical Underpinning of Strategic Influence,” in Dissuading Terror: Strategic Influence and the Struggle Against Terror (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005), 21, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND_MG184.pdf (accessed November 22, 2010).

[15] Kim Cragin and Scott Gerwehr, “The Theoretical Underpinning of Strategic Influence,” in Dissuading Terror: Strategic Influence and the Struggle Against Terror (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005), 22-23, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND_MG184.pdf (accessed November 22, 2010).

[16] Heather S. Gregg, “Beyond Population Engagement: Understanding the Goals of Counterinsurgency,” Parameters 39, no. 3 (2009), 26, http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/Parameters/Articles/09autumn/gregg.pdf (accessed November 30, 2010).

[17] Flynn, Pottinger and Batchelor, Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan, 14.

[18] Herb Daniels, “Keeping COIN Simple: The Outhouse Strategy for Security Development,” Joint Special Operations University Essays (2008), 6, http://www.dtic.mil/ndia/2009SOLIC/danielsessay.pdf (accessed December 1, 2010).

[19] Flynn, Pottinger and Batchelor, Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan, 24.

Using Civilian Marketing Measures and Strategies to “Score” the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) in the Islamic Information Environment

In the spring of 2010, FBI Director Robert Mueller stated before Congress, “there has been a shift in the degree of concern about the affiliates of [al-Qaida] growing in strength and presenting a much enhanced threat to the United States.”[1]  In September of 2010, Ronald Noble, the Head of INTERPOL, warned police chiefs in Paris that extremist websites are skyrocketing, and their growth is making recruitment easier for al-Qaida.[2] These statements beg the question of who is really winning the GWOT after nine years since its declaration.  One methodology to score the GWOT is through looking at the GWOT as though it is a competition between two brands (the United States and the conglomeration of al-Qaida, its franchised affiliates, and other violent Islamic organizations) for dominance in the global Islamic marketplace.  This methodology provides some insights on who may be winning.  Civilian businesses thrive and/or die by their ability influence, leverage, and dominate the marketplace and consumers in order to generate revenue.  Tomer Mozes and Gabriel Weimann from the University of Haifa deduced it is feasible to use civilian marketing concepts to also study the “market” interaction between terrorists and state actors.[3]  Using the well-established civilian marketing measuring systems and strategies of the Net Promoter Score[4] and the Playmaker’s Standard[5] in context of the GWOT generates some interesting conclusions.  Within the context of the global Islamic information environment, trends indicate al-Qaida and its affiliates are increasingly dominating over the United States.  Therefore, the United States must assess and update its Public Diplomacy, Strategic Communications, Department of Defense influence operations, and other “marketing” practices in order change this trend in preventing al-Qaida or its affiliates from ever reaching the goal of establishing a pan-Islamic caliphate.[6]

The first civilian marketing tool useful in gauging the current score of the GWOT in the global information environment is the Net Promoter Score (NPS).  Satmetrix Systems created the NPS as a non-traditional means to measure customer loyalty, market penetration, and general brand satisfaction.  NPS rates customers responses based on whether they would recommend a brand, product, etc. using a 0-to-10 point rating scale, and are categorized as follows:

Promoters (score 9-10) are loyal enthusiasts who will keep buying and refer others, fueling growth.  Passives (score 7-8) are satisfied but unenthusiastic customers who are vulnerable to competitive offerings.  Detractors (score 0-6) are unhappy customers who can damage your brand and impede growth through negative word-of-mouth.  The NPS is calculated by taking the percentage of customers who are Promoters and subtract the percentage who are Detractors.[7]

The usefulness of this tool is it can use trend analysis to determine growth.  If a company is making effective headway in a market, there should be an increase in the number of Promoters and fewer Detractors.  Likewise, an increase in Detractors and decrease in Promoters indicates a decline in market control and customer satisfaction.  The simplistic nature of the NPS makes it exceedingly applicable for adapting data collected from various opinion polls.  The Pew research Center conducts a variety of world opinion polls which are highly applicable to incorporating into analyzing a NPS.

Combining recent trends in Pew Research Center polls with the concept of the NPS creates some insights into who is currently ahead in the struggle for brand dominance in the GWOT.  The twenty-two nation Pew Global Attitudes Survey released in June of 2010 shows that the favorability rating of the U.S. declined across several Muslim countries from 2009-2010 with the exception of a three percent and one percent increase in Turkey and Pakistan respectively (both still give the U.S. the lowest ratings in the survey).[8] The study also indicates the modest levels of confidence and approval President Obama observed in 2009 among Muslim publics have slipped markedly.[9]  In addition, the survey shows a slight cumulative increase in all Muslim countries surveyed (except Nigeria) for the justification of suicide bombing.[10]  This data point presents a significant observation in that this is the first notable increase in favorability for suicide bombing in the past five years.   Relating this data to the NPS, it indicates a cumulative drop in Promoters for the United States, and a potential increase in Detractors.  While this alone does not guarantee an increase in Promoters for al-Qaida, combining this data with trends from another Pew Research poll suggests al-Qaida’s NPS may be increasing.

A Pew Research Center survey focused on Pakistan and released in July of 2010 shows a marked increase in favorable views of al-Qaida.  From 2009-2010, favorable views of al-Qaida increased by nine percent, while unfavorable views and “don’t know” decreased by eight and two percent respectively.[11]  The study also indicated a twenty-three percent decrease in Pakistanis viewing al-Qaida as a threat.[12]  These two shifts are the most significant changes in several years.  This would indicate an increase in Promoters, and a decrease in Detractors and Passives for the al-Qaida brand.  In addition to these polls, other data also indicates a growing net gain in the NPS for extremist Islamic brands over the United States.

The increasing viral spread of al-Qaida’s and related group’s messages on the internet as compared to those of the United States is of concern. As mentioned earlier, the number of extremist websites is rapidly increasing.[13]  In September of 2010, Christopher Boucek testified before Congress on the viral spread of al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) videos on YouTube.  What is significant is these videos are no longer isolated to specific extremist Islamic web forums, but are able to reach a broader audience in the open, and are even subtitled in multiple languages.[14] In comparison, the United States official presence on the web is feeble at best, and few to none of its web-related initiatives have had any viral characteristics, indicating few active Promoters in the web 2.0 information environment as compared to al-Qaida.[15]  If anything, the United States has recently had a significant creation of more Detractors for itself and potential increase of Promoters for al-Qaida, given the current Wikileak releases.[16]  Overall, this indicates a decrease in the United States’ NPS and increase in the NPS for al-Qaida and similar organizations. This is significant considering the U.S. is nine years into the GWOT.  Evgeny Morozov proposes the possibility that “it is not truly the greater appeal of the [al-Qaida] brand but rather a very poor appeal of America’s own brand that leaves many undecided moderates few alternatives but to hate America,”[17] which is still an advantage for al-Qaida. Just as the NPS model shows the U.S. needs to change its “marketing” strategy, other civilian marketing strategies indicate the U.S. needs to re-look public diplomacy and influence efforts.

The second civilian marketing tool applicable to addressing the status/score of the GWOT in the information environment is the Playmaker’s Standard by Playmaker Systems.

The Standard comprises three reference systems, (1) The Playmaker’s Table, a taxonomy of carefully classified and unique strategies, (2) The Playmaker’s Process, a methodology for running and calling plays for improved competitive advantage, and (3) Factors at Play, a source list of variables that influence playmakers and the play action of their marketplaces.[18]

There are twenty-five different plays (see figure 1) organized into three different categories (Assess, Condition, and Engage).  Much like a chess game, the more adept a competitor is to using different “plays” as part of an overall marketing strategy while in competition with another will increase the relative gain of their competitive advantage in the market.[19]

Figure 1. The Playmaker’s Table[20]

            Using the framework of the Playmaker’s Standard shows al-Qaida and other violent extremist Islamic organizations are much more sagacious and holistic in their marketing strategy than the U.S., and thus are starting to acquire a competitive advantage.  For example, the U.S. routinely stays within the “Engage” and “Attack” categories of the above table, and very rarely incorporates other “plays.”[21]  The current methodology of U.S. Public Diplomacy efforts is to create a supply of American ideas in the information environment through bombardment of the internet.  This “Engage” only mentality completely ignores ways to “Assess” or “Condition” (as shown in Figure 1) the market or competition, and ultimately does not create demand.  In addition, when the U.S. does decide to use a play outside of the “Engage” category, it usually is a “Jam” play under the “Condition” category which is an attempt to disable or disorganize a rival’s activities. However, a “Jam” is designed only for short term disruption, and if not part of a larger strategy where the next move is already calculated, it can create unintended effects and allow a stronger counter-move by the competition.[22]  A recent example of this would be convincing YouTube to block terrorist videos, or directly attacking Wikileaks.  Without the use of other Conditioning, Assessing, and Engaging plays, these solitary efforts might actually falter.[23]  This lack of a multifaceted strategy was recently criticized by the Government Accounting Office[24] and to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade.[25]  However, al-Qaida and similar organizations use almost all of the “plays” in the Playmaker’s Standard.

Compared to the United States, al-Qaida and similar organizations use the entirety of the Playmaker’s Standard.  The rapid growth in extremist websites requires individuals who will propagate messages, and clearly indicates the understanding and use of Surrogates (bottom of Figure 1) which includes Partners, Proxies, and Plants.  They are the means by which a player expands its brand.[26] Additionally, extremists routinely show their ability to “Press” (subcategory of Engage in Figure 1) and assert its position into the marketplace through the creative use of new and innovative media.  As example of this is how groups such as Hamas synergize messaging using various media from text messaging, websites, and T-shirts to children’s television shows to promote their ideology.[27]  Also, groups like al-Qaida have traditionally done very well using violent images and other techniques to enhance mobilization[28] which is a function of the “Lure” category of plays by appealing to emotion.  Likewise, extremists Islamic groups are very adept at their ability to “Frame” which is a sub-category of plays under the “Condition” category.  As an example, Glen Robinson, in his work “Jihadi Information Strategy,” shows how al-Qaida has hijacked and modified several concepts in the Islamic faith such as Jahiliyya, Jihad, Waqf, and other concepts.[29] Additionally, individuals such as Ayman al-Zawahiri and  al-Awlaki repeatedly show their attempts at “Divert” plays through such methods as leaking of information to specific media sources, deflecting focus toward Western atrocities against the Muslim world, and other techniques.  Lastly, but most importantly, many terror groups show the ability to sit back and assess.  This is evident by the timing of messages or attacks to achieve the greatest impact on the market and increase their competitive advantage.  Overall, the range of plays as described by the Playmaker’s Standard that al-Qaida and other terror organizations use compared to the U.S. clearly shows the U.S. is at a marked disadvantage.

The use of civilian marketing techniques such as the Net Promoter Score and the Playmaker’s Standard to assess the score of the GWOT within the information environment show the U.S. is currently behind in the marketplace against terrorist competitors such as al-Qaida and others.  These techniques articulate a situation that U.S. policy makers should take to heart and use to change Public Diplomacy policy and execution.  First, the U.S. should take notice that the trend of slipping favorability ratings for the United States, especially in the Middle East, ultimately favors terrorist messaging.  The U.S. should study why this is happening and develop a marketing strategy that is less policy, volume/supply, and push focused while working on creating a more interactive, connective, and pull focused approach to generate a “bond” with the consumer in the marketplace.[30]  Conceptually, this would increase the NPS for the United States.  Secondly, the U.S. must also develop a comprehensive, innovative and multifaceted Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communications strategy that not only effectively engages the marketplace of ideas, but it also continuously conditions and assesses it as done by terrorist groups suggested by the Playmaker Standard model.  To do this, the U.S. must update antiquated policies such as the Smith-Mundt Act to harness the full power of the information environment and be willing to harness non-traditional, subtle, and innovative media sources and surrogates.[31]  Countries, business, and now even terrorist groups around the world emulate the U.S. and its civilian media power; ironically, it is time the U.S. Government look at how to re-harness that power as well.

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[1] Warren Richie, “Al Qaeda Websites Present Growing Threat, FBI’s Mueller Warns,” The Christian Science MonitorMarch 17, 2010, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2010/0317/Al-Qaeda-websites-present-growing-threat-FBI-s-Mueller-warns (accessed September 30, 2010).

[2] BBC News Europe, “Extremist Websites Skyrocketing, Says INTERPOL,” http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11382124 (accessed September 30, 2010).

[3] Tomer Mozes and Gabriel Weimann, “The E-Marketing Strategy of Hamas,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 33, no. 3 (February 5, 2010), 224, http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/553545_793890206_919106671.pdf (accessed September 30, 2010).

[4] Satmetrix Systems, “Net Promoter Score,” http://www.netpromoter.com (accessed September 30, 2010).

[5] Alan Kelly, The Elements of Influence (New York: Plume, 2007), 7.

[6] Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (New York: Berkley Books, 2003), 123.

[7] Satmetrix Systems, “Net Promoter Score.”

[8] Pew Research Center, “Muslim Disappointment: Obama More Popular Abroad than at Home, Global Image of U.S. Continues to Benefit,” Global Attitudes Project (June 17, 2010), 1, http://pewglobal.org/files/pdf/Pew-Global-Attitudes-2010-Pakistan-Report.pdf (accessed September 30, 2010).

[9] Ibid., 3.

[10] Ibid., 66.

[11] Pew Research Center, “America’s Image Remains Poor: Concern about Extremist Threat Slips in Pakistan,” Global Attitudes Project (July 29, 2010),2, http://pewglobal.org/files/pdf/Pew-Global-Attitudes-2010-Pakistan-Report.pdf (accessed September 30, 2010).

[12] Ibid., 12.

[13] BBC News Europe, “Extremist Websites Skyrocketing, Says INTERPOL.”

[14] Christopher Boucek, “U.S. Strategy for Countering Jihadist Websites,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (September 29, 2010), 1, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/0929_testimony_boucek.pdf (accessed November 1, 2010).

[15] Evgeny Morozov, “The Future of “Public Diplomacy 2.0″,” Foreign Policy (June 9, 2009), http://neteffect.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/06/09/the_future_of_public_diplomacy_20 (accessed September 30, 2010).

[16] Larisa Breton and Adam Pearson, “Contextual Truth-Telling to Counter-Extremist-Supportive Messaging Online: The Wikileaks “Collateral Murder” Case Study,” Small Wars Journal (November 6, 2010), 8, http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/595-bretonpearson.pdf (accessed November 6, 2010).

[17] Morozov, “The Future of “Public Diplomacy 2.0.””

[18] Kelly, The Elements of Influence, 8.

[19] Ibid., 27-28.

[20] Kelly, The Elements of Influence, 44.

[21] Marwan M. Kraidy, “Arab Media and US Policy: A Public Diplomacy Reset,” The Stanley Foundation Policy Analysis Brief (January, 2008), 12, http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/publications/pab/PAB08Kraidy.pdf (accessed September 30, 2010).

[22] Kelly, The Elements of Influence, 153.

[23] Howard G. Clark, “10 Reasons Why Blocking Awlaki YouTube Speeches in Counterproductive,” The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (November 5, 2010), http://icsr.info/blog/10-Reasons-Why-Blocking-Awlaki-Youtube-Speeches-is-Counter-Productive (accessed November 5, 2010).

[24] Morozov, “The Future of “Public Diplomacy 2.0.””

[25] Boucek, “U.S. Strategy for Countering Jihadist Websites,” 3.

[26] Kelly, The Elements of Influence, 252.

[27] Mozes and Weimann, “The E-Marketing Strategy of Hamas,” 220.

[28] Gordon H. McCormick and Frank Giordano, “Things Come Together: Symbolic Violence and Guerrilla Mobilisation,” Third World Quarterly 28, no. 2 (2007), 307, http://pdfserve.informaworld.com.libproxy.nps.edu/787733_793890206_771167049.pdf (accessed August 26, 2010).

[29] Glen E. Robinson, “Jihadi Information Strategy,” in Information Strategy and Warfare: A Guide to Theory and Practice, eds. John Arquilla and Douglas Borer A (New York: Routledge, 2007), 88-90.

[30] Kraidy, “Arab Media and US Policy: A Public Diplomacy Reset,” 12.

[31] Boucek, “U.S. Strategy for Countering Jihadist Websites,” 3-4.

Go Big and Go Home: Clock is ticking in Afghanistan

ADM Mullen makes some critical comments during his latest trip to Afghanistan:

 Make-or-break moment in Afghanistan: US military chief

Portion of the article:

“Describing his talks with the new commander in Afghanistan, General David Petraeus, Mullen said the two agreed that the strategy was clear and that now it was a matter of carrying out the war plan.

But he acknowledged that the international force was under pressure to deliver quickly, amid growing impatience on both sides of the Atlantic with a conflict widely seen as a costly stalemate.

“We don’t have a lot of time,” Mullen told staff members at the US embassy in Kabul.

“The clocks are working against us.”

He said the goal was to show progress in the war by the end of the year and to demonstrate that the international force had seized the momentum from the Taliban.

President Barack Obama has set a deadline of July 2011 as the start of a gradual drawdown of US troops, while Afghan President Hamid Karzai has promised that his country’s forces will take over security duties from coalition troops by 2014.”

See the full story HERE.