What do Various Recent U.S. Government Documents Say About the Future of Irregular Warfare for the United States?

The war in Afghanistan, a global recession, the winds of change in North Africa and the Middle East, combined with potential growing conventional and economic threats such as China paint an extremely complex and fluid security environment for the next few decades.  The now non-existent United States Joint Forces Command in its 2010 Joint Operating Environment document predicted an environment of “persistent conflict”[1] were “struggle predominates.”[2] Based on current events, such a prediction seems certainly plausible. A future environment of such potential high security risks with budgetary limitations will make National Security decisions more difficult in prioritizing money to achieve national objectives.  The United States will have to determine whether to prioritize resources against traditional, irregular, catastrophic, or disruptive threats.[3]  Consequently, in preparation for development of future Quadrennial Defense Reviews (QDR), analysis of recent government documents from various national security and defense policy and budgetary areas, along with items from the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS), indicate a prioritization of focus on irregular threats will be essential in ensuring victory for the United States in the future.

The 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS) provides the pivotal guidance for prioritization of efforts in combating future irregular threats.  The NSS as a document ultimately represents the input from agencies across all the elements of national power including the geographic combatant commands (GCC) and should reflect the consensus of these communities.  Additionally, the NSS is the foundation for subsequent security-related strategies (such as the National Defense and Military Strategies), policies, military capability development, and budget allocation.  In the 2010 NSS, President Obama declares the United States “must maintain our military’s conventional superiority, while enhancing its capacity to defeat [irregular] threats.” He goes on to state these types of irregular threats by their very nature will also increasingly pursue unique ways to exploit our reliance on space and cyberspace[4] through low-cost, high-payoff operations.  The use of the term enhance over maintain clearly gives precedence to irregular threats over traditional ones for the foreseeable future.  Additionally, the President goes on to explain that these threats are forcing us to “move beyond traditional distinctions between homeland and national security”[5] where historically the homeland was relatively safe and the only concern was against traditional threats.  This is no longer the case after the 9/11 attacks.  In addition to the NSS, there are several other documents which highlight the importance of focusing on irregular threats.

The 2010 Defense Appropriations Bill also highlights the growing importance of focusing on irregular threats by showcasing where defense monies are increasingly committed.  In December of 2008 as a portion to Department of Defense Directive 3000.07, the Secretary of Defense elevated irregular warfare to the level of traditional warfare in its strategic importance.[6]  Since then there has been a steady focus to increase funding of irregular warfare related programs and activities, but there are still significant budgeting shortfalls.[7]  For example, in 2010 the House Committee on Appropriations approved additional funds for irregular warfare training[8] and other asymmetric threat programs.[9]  Simultaneously, several traditional warfare programs received cuts such as those associated with the F-22 fighter aircraft program, but the Appropriations Committee states more budgetary prioritization needs to be done toward the Secretary of Defense’s 2008 declaration.[10]

Additionally, recent output documents from the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) and related processes point to the significance irregular threats and irregular warfare will play in the future security environment.  The first document is the Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept (IW JOC) published in May of 2010 which is the second iteration of the document since 2007.  It states in addition to historically defined irregular threats, even weaker state actors will resorts to irregular forms of warfare to challenge stronger, conventional military powers like the United States.[11]  The adaptive, protracted, and unique nature of irregular threats dictates they cannot be defeated with military force alone, can be even more powerful than traditional threats, and thus requires a synergistic, whole-of-government approach utilizing all facets of government power.[12]  This document also reiterates that irregular warfare should have equality if not primacy over traditional warfare, as expertise in irregular warfare would allow for an understanding of conventional warfare and other threats/operations.[13]  For example, historical case studies show successful insurgents and other practitioners of irregular warfare have to know enemy conventional/traditional warfare doctrine in order to survive as they are weaker and smaller.[14]

The second document that highlights the priority of irregular threats and irregular warfare is the Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report (QRM) from 2009.  This document analyzes changes the Department of Defense has made since the last QDR, and highlights the future direction for inclusion in subsequent security documents such as the National Defense Strategy, etc.[15]  This document specifically highlights irregular warfare and three other focus areas for analysis to highlight progress since the 2006 QDR and give recommendations on future efforts.  In order just to achieve balance between defensive, irregular, and conventional warfare capabilities, the study indicated there are still gaps in institutionalizing irregular warfare concepts and capabilities along with interagency integration into irregular warfare constructs.[16]  In all, the QRM highlights that prioritization of irregular threats and irregular warfare will still be critical in achieving national security objectives for the foreseeable future.[17]

Lastly, the 2010 Joint Operating Environment (JOE) relays the importance of prioritizing irregular threats for future conflicts.  The purpose of the JOE is to inform and assist in joint concept, policy, and procurement program development for achieving national objectives.  First, the document states that the United States as failed to “recognize and fully confront the irregular fight” it is in. Because of this, the United States would be ill advised to strip irregular warfare from its doctrine as was done after the Vietnam War; [18] the results in a future conflict would even more significant than what has occurred in Afghanistan and Iraq.  Because of this, the United States must focus on truly understanding irregular warfare, collecting lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan, and incorporating those lessons into future doctrine, policies, and capabilities.  Second, the JOE states that focusing on irregular warfare is crucial because although there will still be traditional warfare, the predominance of conflict the United States will see will be irregular and potentially more critical to American interests.[19]  Therefore, it is crucial the United States can dominate and win such conflicts.  Third, the skills necessary to succeed at irregular warfare can also create the capabilities to generate indicators and warnings to prevent catastrophic and disruptive threats.  For example, irregular warfare requires intensive human intelligence to be successful.  This same capability if successfully developed could also be used to generate sources to learn about adversarial weapons of mass destruction production and/or proliferation as well as other emerging unknown disruptive capabilities.[20]

For well over half a century America has been a military superpower which has had no equal on the conventional battlefield.  However, the last decade has shown the United States that it was ill prepared for a fight against irregular threats and the conduct of irregular warfare.  With the current recession plaguing the United States, money will quickly constrain future security budgets forcing the Department of Defense and other government agencies to establish the most efficient means in safeguarding America’s vital security interests and achieving national security strategy objectives in the future.  If irregular threats are the most common future peril to America, it only seems natural to invest in irregular warfare, making it as robust and lethal as our conventional/traditional warfare capability.

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[1] United States Joint Forces Command, The Joint Operating Environment (JOE) 2010 (Suffolk, VA: United States Joint Forces Command, 2010), 4, http://www.jfcom.mil/newslink/storyarchive/2010/JOE_2010_o.pdf (accessed January 15, 2011).

[2] Ibid., 6.

[3] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2004: A Strategy for Today; A Vision for Tomorrow (Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, 2004), 4, http://www.defense.gov/news/mar2005/d20050318nms.pdf (accessed February 8, 2011).

[4] United States Government, 2010 National Security Strategy (Washington, D.C.: United States Government, 2010), 17, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf (accessed October 21, 2010).

[5] Ibid., 10.

[6] United States Department of Defense, Department of Defense Directive 3000.07 (December, 2008), 2, http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300007p.pdf (accessed January 15, 2011).

[7] United States House of Representatives. Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2010, 111th Cong., 1st sess., 2009, 64, http://www.dtic.mil/congressional_budget/pdfs/FY2010_pdfs/HAC_111-230.pdf (accessed January 15, 2011).

[8] Ibid., 10.

[9] Ibid., 165.

[10] Ibid., 64.

[11] United States Department of Defense, Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats Joint Operating Concept (JOC) (May 17, 2010), 4, http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/concepts/iw_joc2_0.pdf (accessed January 15, 2011).

[12] United States Department of Defense, Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats Joint Operating Concept (JOC), 14.

[13] Ibid., C-1-3.

[14] Syed Saleem Shahzad, “Al-Qaeda’s Guerrilla Chief Lays Out Strategy,” Asia TimesOctober 15, 2009, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/KJ15Df03.html (accessed September 18, 2010).

[15] United States Department of Defense, Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report (QRM) (January, 2009), 1, www.defense.gov/news/Jan2009/QRMFinalReport_v26Jan.pdf (accessed January 15, 2011).

[16] Ibid., 11.

[17] United States Department of Defense, Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report, 9.

[18] United States Joint Forces Command, The Joint Operating Environment (JOE) 2010, 62.

[19] Ibid., 65.

[20] United States Joint Forces Command, The Joint Operating Environment (JOE) 2010, 67.